City Council Meeting
08-12-19
Item 6.A.

Council Agenda Report

To: Mayor Wagner and the Honorable Members of the City Council

Prepared by: Christi Hogin, City Attorney

Date prepared: August 1, 2019 Meeting date: August 12, 2019

Subject: Management Partners Report on City Response to the Woolsey Fire

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RECOMMENDED ACTION: Receive report presented by Management Partners regarding the City's response to the Woolsey Fire.

FISCAL IMPACT: There is no fiscal impact associated with the recommended action.

DISCUSSION: On January 28, 2019, the Council tasked the Disaster Response and Recovery Ad Hoc Committee to obtain quotes for hiring an independent investigator to conduct a meaningful and independent review of the City's performance in managing the response to the Woolsey Fire. On March 11, 2019, the Council authorized the Mayor to execute a Professional Services Agreement with Management Partners to evaluate the City's response to the Woolsey Fire for an amount not to exceed $50,000.

Attached is the report of Management Partners submitted to the City Council in connection with its assignment set forth in the professional services agreement dated March 11, 2019.

Representatives from Management Partners will present their findings at the August 12, 2019 Council meeting.

ATTACHMENTS: Management Partners report

City of Malibu

Review of Woolsey Fire Response by Malibu City Management

DRAFT: July 26, 2019

Management Partners

Management Partners

July 26, 2019

The Honorable Jefferson Wagner, Mayor
Ms. Karen Ferrer, Mayor Pro Tem
Mr. Mikke Pierson, Councilmember
Mr. Rick Mullen, Councilmember
Mr. Skylar Peak, Councilmember
23823 Stuart Ranch Road
Malibu, CA 90265

Dear Malibu City Council Members,

Management Partners is pleased to transmit this draft report concerning the City's response to the Woolsey Fire and how the City can improve emergency preparedness and disaster response.

We are releasing this report as a draft document. Typically, Management Partners would review the report with the client before issuing a final report to ensure that the data, information and assumptions that serve as the basis of our observations and recommendations are accurate and supportable. In this case it was decided to release the report as a draft to staff and the City Council concurrently in order to avoid any appearance that staff may have unduly influenced our observations and recommendations. We did provide a copy of the draft report to the City Attorney for review with respect to any legal issues. Our observations and recommendations represent the work of the Management Partners team based on our interviews and review of pertinent documents and consideration of industry best practices.

Also, it possible that some of the recommendations contained in this report are already underway or being implemented, or at least elements of them. Response to this fire has and continues to be a high priority for the City. This report will stand as a compendium which can guide City efforts to improve preparation and public understanding around disasters such as the Woolsey fire. Because if there is anything the many people with whom we talked can agree on, it is that such an event will reoccur.

Management Partners will consider any comments on this draft report by the City Council and staff and make any adjustments which are warranted. Then a final report will be provided to the City.

In considering this report it should be noted that Malibu is a relatively small city and organization. Its population of approximately 12,700 makes it one of the smaller cities in the state. Geographically it is also much smaller than the area known as Malibu, not to mention the global brand that is Malibu.

Malibu is also one of the newest cities in California. When it came into existence as an incorporated city in 1991, service delivery arrangements for public safety and other services

were already quite mature. The City was formed mainly to prevent the installation of a wastewater (sewer) system and to secure control of land use planning. Therefore, existing service delivery arrangements, mainly with Los Angeles County, have largely been left in place.

This has important implications for disaster response, because it is Los Angeles County, not the City itself, that is actually responsible for the first responders and many other services that either provide or impact disaster response. This makes sense in many ways because the populated area of Malibu is actually much larger than the City, and Los Angeles (LA) County Fire and the LA County Sheriff's Department are very large and capable emergency service providers.

But Malibu's international name recognition, coupled with the reality that it is a small city without direct service responsibility for public safety first-responder services creates a unique complication when disaster strikes. Malibu will be the by-line for any event happening in the general vicinity, but the City of Malibu itself is not directly in charge. For the most part, members of the public (even City residents) do not understand this, and it creates complications relative to presumed responsibility and control, which can complicate communication.

The nature of emergency response in the City does hold important lessons in understanding how disaster response can be improved and the City's role in the process. Most importantly, while the City's role is limited **during** an emergency, it can play a central and critical role in **planning** for disasters. The City should take an active role as a convener of the large public safety agencies that actually deliver services, and advocate for an integrated planned response that takes the City's unique features (especially as it relates to distinct neighborhoods, access and arterial movements) into consideration.

Important lessons for the future can be learned from the Woolsey Fire when it comes to properly aligning the City's role with its true responsibilities and capabilities. Better integration between the County of Los Angeles and the City will improve communications with the public and other responder agencies. The recognition that the City is mainly acting in a support role to the County in emergencies will lead to better and more realistic training and emergency response planning.

The reality of service delivery arrangements means emergency response in Malibu is much more of an intergovernmental challenge than is the case in more traditional municipalities that directly operate first responder services. This report offers several recommendations that speak to this relatively unique challenge along with other factors that make emergency response in Malibu both complex and critically important. Reviews such as this are part of a continuous learning culture for high-performing organizations and represent a best practice in public service.

Sincerely,

Andrew Belknap
Regional Vice President

Table of Contents

Executive Summary **1**
Project Approach 5
Major Areas of Focus 5
Background **7**
First Responder Institutional Arrangements in Malibu 9
Police Services *13*
Fire Services and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) *13*
Los Angeles County After Action Reports 13
Pre-Event Planning and Training **15**
Coordination with Outside Agencies 15
Major Observations *15*
Recommendations *17*
EOC Training and Preparedness 18
Major Observations *18*
Recommendations *19*
CERT and Community Involvement 20
Major Observations *20*
Recommendations *21*
Organizational Structure and EOC Operations **23**
EOC and Relocation of the EOC 23
Major Observations *23*
Recommendations *25*
EOC Policies and Procedures 25
Major Observations *26*
Recommendations *27*
Information Gathering and Dissemination **29**
Clarifying the Role of the City 29
Major Observations *29*
Recommendations *30*
Gathering Information from Emergency Responders 30

Major Observations *31*
Recommendations *31*
Community Communications 32
Major Observations *32*
Recommendations *34*
Evacuation and Repopulation 37
Implementation of the Mandatory Evacuation 37
Major Observations *37*
Recommendations *39*
Repopulation Efforts 40
Major Observations *40*
Recommendations *40*
Conclusion 42
Attachment A. List of Recommendations 43
Attachment B. List of Interviews Conducted 47
Attachment C. List of Documents Reviewed 48
Attachment D. List of Nixle Alerts Sent by City of Malibu 49

Tables

Table 1. Matrix of First Responders and Critical Service Providers to the City of Malibu 10
Table 2. List of Interviewees 47

Figures

Figure 1. Summary of Major City of Malibu Fire Response Activities 9
Figure 2. Map of City of Malibu, Unincorporated LA County, Pepperdine University 10
Figure 3. Relationship between Malibu and External Emergency Response Agencies 12

Executive Summary

Management Partners' assignment was to conduct a review of the City's preparation for a wildfire event and execution of the response by City management to the Woolsey Fire (Fire) in November of 2018. Further, we were asked to develop recommendations to guide preparation and operational needs that would enable the City and the community to strengthen their response to an event of this magnitude in the future.

The focus of this work is on the City and its response. Our review does not include evaluation of first responders such as Los Angeles (LA) County Fire or the Los Angeles County Sheriff. However, we do evaluate the City's communication with other responding agencies and how that important function can be improved.

Management Partners reviewed the City's emergency policies and procedures, interviewed City staff members, community members, elected officials, and representatives from partner agencies involved in the fire response, and analyzed the information gathered to inform recommendations we believe may improve the City's future responses. We also gathered information and "lessons learned" from other communities in California and elsewhere that have conducted similar evaluations following such incidents to determine where gaps may have occurred in Malibu and opportunities for improvement.

This report first provides background on the Woolsey Fire. Next the institutional arrangements surrounding emergency first responders are described. This is critical information in understanding the City's approach to the Woolsey Fire or any emergency, because the City does not control or direct any first responder services itself.

We then discuss the ongoing efforts mainly sponsored by LA County Emergency Operations and LA County Fire to develop "after action" reports on first responder activities in the Woolsey Fire. Next, the report provides observations and recommendations surrounding several major activities involving the City's response to the Fire. The discussion includes pre-event planning and training within the City, the City's organizational structure and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) operations, how City leaders gathered and disseminated information

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during the event and the evacuation and repopulation efforts. This report provides our major observations and recommendations based on information gathered through qualitative analysis of interview notes, background information reviewed, and publicly available information. A complete list of recommendations is provided in Attachment A.

Management Partners believes that in addition to gaining an understanding of how City staff handled the Woolsey Fire, it is important to acknowledge that the community expressed strong interest in the following two major issues:

1. The firefighting strategy and approach used in the Woolsey Fire. Many in the community want to understand why firefighting personnel were not able to actively fight structure fires during the event despite fire resources being in the area. Management Partners was not engaged to evaluate the response or tactics used by the LA County Fire Department, which serves Malibu as a separately governed and managed fire protection district, or CalFire, which had a supporting role to LA County Fire. Other studies underway may be able to address this serious concern.

2. Logistical protocols and decision-making responsibilities for the evacuation and repopulation of Malibu's neighborhoods. This is a complex issue with many agencies contributing to these decisions, including the City of Malibu. Our observations and recommendations address some of the issues that surfaced during interviews, but we are unable to evaluate the performance of other public safety or first responder agencies who were in the lead and carried out the evacuation and repopulation of the impacted areas. It is clear that significant improvements can and should be made in terms of evacuation/repopulation planning and protocols.

In addition to the observations provided later in this report, Management Partners' team members believe the following major observations provide important context for understanding the City's challenges in responding to this massive fire.

1. ***The City of Malibu is not a first responder for any fire event and there is considerable confusion and misinformation regarding the City's role and responsibility before, during and after a fire event.*** There is considerable misunderstanding about the institutions providing police and fire service to Malibu residents. This has impacted and continues to impact public perceptions about the City's role in such a massive event. Fire/emergency medical service is provided by a separate, sizable local governmental

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agency (the Los Angeles County Fire Department) which has independent decision-making authority as to how fire service is delivered and as a first responder. Police services are provided by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and, while on contract to the City, they also have independent decision-making authority with respect to how law enforcement efforts are handled. Further, water and other utility services are operated by LA County or private franchises. Even the main (and only) north/south arterial, State Route 1 (Pacific Coast Highway is owned and operated by the State Department of Transportation (Caltrans).

2. ***The City of Malibu, as an organization, is quite small and it relies on large, independent public safety agencies for emergency response services (police and fire). Staying informed and exerting influence during this event stretched City staff and its EOC pre-planned structure and operation.*** The City is geographically only a subset of the area known as Malibu. The incorporated city extends only one-half mile to two-and-a-half miles (at its widest point) from the Pacific Ocean. Pepperdine University and several of the canyon areas are not within the City limits. However, its name recognition and common perceptions about local government leads to the perception that the City of Malibu has a larger footprint than is in fact the case. The asymmetry that exists between the large countywide (or even statewide) agencies responsible for emergency response in Malibu creates challenges in an emergency for a City operation the size of Malibu.

3. ***While not unusual, the public safety agencies' (mostly first responders) Incident Command Post (ICP) was not located remotely near either of the City's Emergency Operation Centers during the event, which significantly impacted the City's ability to communicate information effectively.*** Decisions about how to respond were being conducted by a different command and management structure at the ICP and the City was challenged by geography, the fire incident itself, communication tools and lean staffing to gain and provide good information. Disaster response planning always emphasizes the importance of physical co-location whenever possible to enable good communication and problem solving.

4. ***The need to change the location of the City's EOC during the fire reset the City's emergency response framework and impacted performance in terms of staffing, communications and the City's***

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ability to influence logistical decisions unrelated to fighting the actual fire. While the Santa Monica location turned out to be a robust and excellent one at the time, some City staff were challenged to get there. They had to learn new roles, while other key staff (including the City Manager) had to remain in Malibu to respond to issues closer to home.

5. ***The lack of a pre-planned, mutually agreed upon coordinated evacuation plan (across all first responders and the City) and agreed upon repopulation protocols in a city with a geographic topography like Malibu and the surrounding area resulted in major problems for City staff and considerable dissatisfaction by the community.*** The situation was exacerbated by the incident itself and the ability to communicate information effectively to residents and other local responders. Coordination with Caltrans and California Highway Patrol (CHP) by the Sheriff's Department should have occurred prior to the issuance of evacuation orders to facilitate a safe and expeditious departure for residents. Ironically, City staff had developed detailed neighborhood-level information to facilitate evacuations, but because they are not in charge of leading such an effort, this information and planning went largely unused. Additionally, City leaders were not consulted by those responsible for the evacuation efforts.

6. ***Community meeting facilitation and communication skills during an event as impactful as the Woolsey Fire require special training to be able to effectively respond to the concerns and real fears of those in attendance.*** The stress during and after such an incident can be of the magnitude experienced by major life-threatening events. As a result of all the wildfires and other tragedies in the state, training for civilians (non-safety personnel) is becoming more available.

Fortunately, learning can be drawn from these observations and in many cases planning and practice can improve performance. Two important themes run through the remainder of this analysis. First, since Malibu relies on third-party public-safety first responders, it is critical that City leaders pursue greater integration with these agencies in all planning and practice efforts. Second, City leaders need to focus their efforts based on the actual level of control and influence, emphasizing their role as a communicator and convener with detailed knowledge of the City streets, and rights-of-way, neighborhoods and geography. Just because the City is not a first responder itself does not mean it has little role. To the

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contrary, it has a critical role to play in planning how emergencies will be handled, and in communicating during a disaster.

This report is organized into the following sections:

- Background
- Pre-Event Planning and Training
- Organizational Structure and EOC Operations
- Information Gathering and Dissemination
- Evacuation and Repopulation
- Conclusion
- Attachment A— List of Recommendations
- Attachment B —List of Interviews Conducted
- Attachment C— List of Documents Reviewed
- Attachment D—List of Nixle Alerts Sent, November 9 through November 21

Project Approach

Management Partners gathered information by conducting interviews and reviewing relevant documents, as described below.

Interviews: Management Partners conducted 36 interviews (see Attachment B) to gain an understanding of the program, policies and procedures, and opportunities for improvement.

Document Review: During this review Management Partners analyzed numerous City documents related to the project. These included ordinances, Emergency Operations Plan (2012), contracts, public comments, presentations made, media coverage, and records of alerts sent out. A list of documents reviewed is shown in Attachment C.

Major Areas of Focus

As noted above, this report begins with some background information on the fire incident itself, and then on a discussion of how first responder emergency services are organized and directed in Malibu. It is crucial to understand this background in order to understand the City's role in an emergency such as the Woolsey Fire.

Our analysis and recommendations are categorized into the following major areas of focus regarding the City's role:

1. Pre-Event Planning and Training
2. Organizational Structure and EOC Operations
3. Information Gathering and Dissemination
4. Evacuation and Repopulation

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The interviews clarified the events that transpired, roles and responsibilities during a natural disaster, and the emergency operations plan. This also allowed us to identify gaps in responsibilities or communications that led to inefficiencies or misunderstandings. Each of the areas of focus is described below with our major observations and recommendations for improvement. We present the observations first and then follow with recommendations flowing from these observations.

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Background

The Woolsey Fire began on November 8, 2018, killed three people, burned 96,949 acres of land, destroyed 1,643 structures, and led to the evacuation of more than 295,000 people in the 13 days before it was contained. The City of Malibu lost over 670 structures, including more than 400 single-family homes with an estimated market value of at least $1.6 billion.

The Woolsey Fire began at 3:00 pm on Thursday, November 8, 2018. The fire began in a designated Mutual Threat Zone (MTZ) that drew a joint response from Ventura County Fire, LA County Fire, and LA City Fire departments. The MTZ meant that all agencies shared in a unified response and command. The unified command was established because multiple agencies had jurisdictional authority. Ultimately CalFire assumed command because the fire was in a State Responsibility Area (SRA).

On Thursday, the City placed its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on standby, and by 3:30 pm had sent the first alert out to the community. [Because severe fire conditions had been predicted and a public safety power shutoff (PSPS) was anticipated, the City had begun positioning itself for a possible fire event on November 6.]

Early Friday morning at 1:00 am mandatory evacuations began south of the US Route 101 (referred to as the 101) and the EOC opened at City Hall in Malibu. At 5:15 am, the fire jumped the 101 which triggered City alerts notifying residents of the mandatory evacuation. A unified command post was established in Thousand Oaks with representatives from LA County Sheriff's Office, LA County Fire, and Ventura Fire. Ventura and LA County Fire ran the joint command center together until CalFire took over. (The wildlands generally between Malibu and Highway 101 are a State Responsibility Area where CalFire takes the lead in wildfire responses.) On Friday, the City of Malibu requested traffic control support from Caltrans, the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.

By Friday afternoon, City Hall was evacuated as part of the mandatory citywide evacuation. The City moved the EOC to Santa Monica, which

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was open on Saturday, November 10 at 8:05 am. The EOC remained fully staffed with representatives from City staff from this point through November 26, including a City staff member representative assigned to the Command Post in Thousand Oaks along with the Los Angeles County Sheriff Incident Management Team.

A unified ICP was initially established in the Thousand Oaks area with the Ventura and Los Angeles County public safety agencies before it was moved to Camarillo. City Hall phones were redirected to a staff representative and answered 24/7 during this time. In addition to being at the EOC, the City Manager and other staff representatives returned to Malibu to deliver N95 masks, food, water, and other supplies to community members who had stayed behind.

November 13 marks the beginning of the recovery efforts, which lasted through November 20. City Hall did not reopen until November 27. On November 13, the City of Malibu held a Town Hall meeting with 2,000 attendees in Santa Monica to communicate efforts that were underway to help restore the City to safe conditions. Outside agencies like Southern California Edison and representatives from the City's Public Works Department were deployed to restore powerlines and clear debris.

City staff attended daily repopulation meetings and coordinated relief efforts such as redirecting mail, delivering mobile cell towers, securing gas to run generators, requesting medical resources, and conducting welfare checks using the City's CERT team. Residents were allowed to return to their homes on Sunday, November 25.

Since then, City leaders in Malibu have been focused on the rebuilding phase by removing additional debris, reconstructing or repairing damaged or destroyed structures, and facilitating public meetings. A summary of major events throughout November is provided below in Figure 1. For additional details on the alerts sent through the City's Nixle system, refer to Attachment D.

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Figure 1. Summary of Major City of Malibu Fire Response Activities

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8 3:00 pm - Fire begins 3:30 pm – City sends alert to community 5:00 pm – EOC Team placed on standby	9 1:00 am – Mandatory evacuations ordered (portions of Malibu) 1:33 am - City sends out first Nixle alert 2:30 am – EOC Opens 12:29 pm – Citywide evacuation ordered, notification sent 4:00 pm – EOC evacuates City Hall	10 8:05 am – EOC re-opens in Santa Monica 12:00 pm – Food and water delivered to Zuma Beach 4:30 pm – Press briefing held at Command Post
11	12	13 7:00pm – Town Hall held at Santa Monica High School *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	14 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	15 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	16 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	17 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*
18 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	19 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	20 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	21 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	22 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	23 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*	24 *City staff attended daily repopulation meetings with partner agencies*
25 Residents allowed to return home	26 4:00 pm – EOC closes	27	28	29	30	

As part of the City's rebuilding efforts, elected officials, other advisory body representatives, management staff and community members want to better understand the events that transpired before, during, and after the Woolsey Fire with a focus on the City's response. As mentioned previously, Management Partners was engaged to help identify what was expected to happen, what actually happened, what went well and why, and what can be improved. Reviews such as this are part of a continuous learning culture for high-performing organizations and represent a best practice in public service.

First Responder Institutional Arrangements in Malibu

Public safety and first responder emergency response services, as well as other services are provided to City residents (and the surrounding area) primarily by government agencies other than the City of Malibu. The City of Malibu does not have public safety personnel responsible for emergency response, crime prevention, emergency medical services (EMS) or fire suppression.

Malibu is one of the newest and smallest (population 12,900) cities in California. When it was incorporated in 1991 service delivery responsibilities were well settled and have generally remained as they then existed. As mentioned previously, the City is served by Los Angeles County public safety agencies responsible for serving a large percentage of the entire County. The City of Malibu is bordered by an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County in which the mailing addresses of the properties include the Malibu name, despite being located outside the city limits. Figure 2 shows the map of the city limits as well as the unincorporated area and Pepperdine University.

Figure 2. Map of City of Malibu, Unincorporated LA County, Pepperdine University



[1]Population figures do not include Pepperdine University's enrollment of 7,632 and staff/faculty population of approximately 700.

The size, magnitude, and services delivered by such large agencies, when compared to a small city such as Malibu, was a major contributor to the communication challenges experienced by City staff during the incident. A summary of the agencies that provide emergency response and other critical services is provided in Table 1. First responder agencies are shown in **bold, red** font.

Table 1. Matrix of First Responders and Critical Service Providers to the City of Malibu

Agency Responsible	Emergency/ Critical Services	Relationship to the City of Malibu	Population Served	Number of Employees
Los Angeles County Department of Animal Care and Control	Animal Control	Contract with City	3 million	442
City of Malibu	• Building Inspection • Wastewater[1] • Public Works[2]	N/A	12,957	96.55

Agency Responsible	Emergency/ Critical Services	Relationship to the City of Malibu	Population Served	Number of Employees
Southern California Edison	Electric Utility	Franchise	15 million	12,521
Los Angeles County Sanitation District	Wastewater	Special District	5.6 million	450
Los Angeles County Fire Department	**Fire and EMS Services**	**Special District**	**4 million**	**>5,000**
CalFire	**Wildfire Response**	**State Agency**	**>39 million**	**>6,100**
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	**Police Services**	**Contract with City**	**10 million**	**Approximately 18,000**
California Department of Transportation	Operation/Maintenance, Pacific Coast Highway (SR1)	State Agency	30 million	Approximately 18,000
California Highway Patrol, Southern Division	**Patrol, Pacific Coast Highway (SR1)**	**State Agency**	**10 million**	**>1,500**
Los Angeles County Department of Public Health	Public Health	County Agency	10 million	4,100
Los Angeles County Waterworks District[3]	Water Services	Special District	244,652	Approximately 4,000

[1]The majority of City residential properties are on septic systems.
[2]Includes rights of way, city streets, and storm drain functions.
[3]District 21 – Operated by Los Angeles County Department of Public Works, Waterworks Division.

The City's relationship with agencies responsible for emergency or critical services is shown in Figure 3. The vast majority of the primary emergency response services is provided either by Los Angeles County or a dependent special district of the County, the LA County Fire Department.

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Figure 3. Relationship between Malibu and External Emergency Response Agencies

[1]*City contracts for the level of service and does not have operational control over these functions.*

As Table 1 and Figure 3 show, for the most part Malibu is served by first responders that are part of Los Angeles County or the State of California. These agencies have governance and organizational structures separate and distinct from the City. The nature of the relationship varies however, with the Sheriff providing services through a contract while LA County Fire is technically a special district that includes the boundaries of Malibu. All the agencies serving the City of Malibu dwarf the city in terms of organizational size and budget. The size, magnitude, and services delivered by such large agencies, when compared to a small city such as Malibu, led to communication challenges.

Police Services

As mentioned previously, the City contracts with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) for its law enforcement services. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is the largest sheriff's department in the world (according to the LASD website), with approximately 18,000 employees. The department serves an area of over 4,000 square miles and a population of almost 10 million people. LASD runs 25 stations, and contracts with 40 cities, 90 unincorporated communities, 216 facilities, hospitals, and clinics throughout the community, nine community colleges, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, and 47 Superior Courts. The contract between the City of Malibu and LASD dictates the level of service provided and is negotiated every few years.

Approximately one mile of the Pacific Coast Highway, which runs right through Malibu, is patrolled by the Southern Division of the California Highway Patrol (CHP). However, the portion of the Pacific Coast Highway that is within Malibu City limits is the responsibility of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department as the contract law enforcement agency for the City. The Southern Division is one of eight CHP divisions and represents the smallest geographic area but has the largest number of uniformed and non-uniformed employees due to the significant workload demand. One-third of all CHP motorcycles are assigned to the Southern Division to serve the unique landscape, diverse population, and high levels of tourism.

Fire Services and Emergency Medical Services (EMS)

The City is within the Los Angeles County Fire Department District, which provides all EMS and fire services including incident response, fire prevention and inspection. The Department's Forestry Division also provides resource management and brush clearance services for fire prevention and protection. The Los Angeles County Fire Department serves four million residents in 58 cities and all unincorporated communities within Los Angeles County. The department receives approximately one million calls for service each year and has nine divisions, comprised of 170 stations and approximately 5,000 employees.

Los Angeles County After Action Reports

In December 2018, the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors instructed the Chief Executive's Office to convene a Task Force to review the response to and recovery from the Woolsey Fire. The County contracted with Citygate Associates, LLC as the consultant to assist the County and Task Force to develop an After Action Report that highlights the lessons learned, best practices, and areas for improvement.

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To date, Citygate has met with County partners to develop a project plan. Citygate has also convened a Task Force (comprised of elected officials from Los Angeles County and impacted cities), County department directors, the Los Angeles County Operational Area partners, federal and state partners, representatives from Ventura County, and members of the impacted communities. Two community listening sessions have been held, one on February 23 in the City of Malibu at Pepperdine University and the second on March 3 in the City of Calabasas at King Gillette Ranch. Both Community Listening Sessions were live streamed on YouTube and written minutes are available on the County's website. Currently, Citygate is working with five identified working groups.

- **Fire Response.** Focused on the successes and areas of improvement for deployment, distribution, adequacy of firefighting resources and availability of mutual aid during the Woolsey Fire
- **Communications**. Focused on the successes and areas of improvement for communication between the County and the general public, communication between the County and impacted cities, and communication between first responders
- **Evacuation and Response.** Focused on successes and areas of improvement for evacuation and repopulation notifications and procedures utilized during the Woolsey Fire
- **Transition to Recovery.** Focused on successes and areas of improvement for the efficiency of transition from response to short-term recovery
- **Impacted Cities Leadership.** Focused on fire response, communications, evacuation and repopulation, and transition to recovery from the cities' perspectives

Citygate's project plan includes development of a draft After-Action Report and improvement plan to be completed in August of 2019. The schedule shows the final task force meeting to be held in October 2019 where the first draft of the report will be presented.

In addition to this after action report the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center (LACEOC) is also doing an After Action Report. This report will address response and communications across all the first responder agencies. It will be released later this year.

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Pre-Event Planning and Training

Malibu staff take planning for an emergency event such as a wildfire quite seriously. They frequently practice for emergency events, have invested in a disaster notification system and have a dedicated public safety manager position (relatively unusual in a contract city not fielding first responder services). This is merited by the history of disaster events, especially wildfires, that have impacted Malibu during its entire existence as a community.

Nevertheless, there are areas City leaders can address to improve their performance and effectiveness. Of primary importance is the need to adapt Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) training to align with the City's primary role as a communicator during an emergency, and as a convener to bring together first responders prior to an emergency to train around Malibu's unique needs.

Below, we present our major observations in this area followed by recommendations for improvement.

Coordination with Outside Agencies

The inherent nature of contracting with external agencies for public safety and fire services creates challenges regarding communication and ownership of specific tasks. The fact that Malibu is served by or contracts with various county and state agencies for public safety and fire services limits the ability for collaborative training exercises to occur. Below, we outline our major observations and recommendations related to the City's relationship with outside agencies for training and preparedness efforts.

Major Observations

1. ***The public safety response delivery system and structure within and around Malibu involves a diverse and varied set of institutions and local government agencies, making training and pre-planning challenging.*** Malibu is surrounded by various stakeholders, public and private agencies, as well as large County agencies including the Sheriff, Fire Department, Pepperdine University, Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, Water District,

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Southern California Edison, Caltrans, CHP, and others. Nonetheless, the City of Malibu is viewed by the community as the local governmental agency responsible for emergency coordination from "A to Z."

2. ***Many factors that impacted the City's response were not within their formal authority to control or ability to influence during the incident***. For this very reason, all agencies with responsibility for emergency response (LA County Fire and Sheriff, CalFire, Caltrans, Highway Patrol, LA County Animal Control, LA County Water, Southern California Edison and the City) need to train together on an annual basis, at a minimum. The trainings should include mandatory evacuation procedures and repopulation protocols.

   The City's SEMS plan and their training efforts have positioned them well for disaster preparedness and response, but the magnitude of this event and the multi-jurisdictional nature of it created certain challenges and conflicts that left City leaders struggling to understand how the response efforts were carried out and unable to effectively communicate to the public what was occurring.

3. ***Malibu City staff experienced role confusion as they transitioned from the primary EOC to an EOC coordinated by an interagency team at the County.*** When that change occurred, their role became one of gathering and disseminating information, rather than directing the response. Federal Energy Management Agency (FEMA) training emphasizes the direction and control needed for an incident within a single jurisdiction in directing the response. In larger incidents, particularly when public safety services are being provided by contract, the control shifts to higher levels of government and changes the emphasis of the work within the EOC. There are still important roles for the City's EOC to undertake but understanding the shift helps everyone prepare to be more focused on what they should be doing.

4. ***Representatives from LA Fire and LA Sheriff's Department participate in City drills one or two times per year.*** To have the City's Emergency Operations Manual certified by the State of California, one of the requirements is to have multi-agency participation in training and drills. Comments by some fire staff indicated they believe their own, existing trainings may be

DRAFT

sufficient, which may certainly be true for LA Fire operations, but not necessarily for purposes of ensuring coordination with the City regarding evacuation and repopulation. There is no formally assigned liaison from LA Fire during active incidents, though the local Assistant Chief is assigned general liaison duties with other cities, which may also be delegated to the Malibu Battalion Chief. As stated above, the City should take the lead in organizing true multi-agency trainings and organizing for communication among this complicated cast of agencies.

5. ***The City maintains an EOC that is physically separate from the LA County EOC and even though both agencies provide a liaison to the other, this complicates emergency response.*** A central tenant of emergency response is that operational representatives should work in physical proximity to "huddle" on problems as they arise or are perceived and solve problems. Communication and problem-solving ability inevitably deteriorate as one relies on third-party interlocutors, emails, text messages, phones and the like.

Recommendations

The following recommendations relate to coordination with outside agencies and largely revolve around establishing formal relationships with the agencies that provide emergency response services for the City of Malibu.

Recommendation 1. Form an emergency Malibu Disaster Council (multi-agency committee) that includes all relevant stakeholders susceptible to wildfire events and other major disasters. An overarching structure that incorporates all stakeholders needs to be established to ensure cooperative and comprehensive planning efforts are held with others in the region.

Recommendation 2. Conduct training exercises quarterly with partner agencies that would provide service to the City of Malibu in the case of an emergency.

Recommendation 3. Conduct one or more EOC drills with partner public safety and transportation agencies that involve an evacuation of residents. These mock evacuation trainings and drills should incorporate residents as volunteer evacuees to support ongoing public education efforts.

DRAFT

Recommendation 4. Work with other municipalities and public safety personnel through regional, large-scale, public events to expose and train staff on emergency response mobilization and enhance the experience levels of EOC staff.

Recommendation 5. Work with the LA Fire Department to formally assign a staff member to work with the City moving forward on training exercises.

Recommendation 6. Train several City staff members about City Council liaison responsibilities so the City Manager is not the sole person tasked with this responsibility.

EOC Training and Preparedness

City of Malibu staff conduct regular EOC training exercises and try to continually make improvements by working with outside agencies. However, the Woolsey Fire conditions created an unprecedented situation that resulted in the EOC relocation to Santa Monica and reliance on multiple outside agencies for information and fire suppression services. This section outlines our major observations and recommendations related to the City's preparedness and training.

Major Observations

1. ***City staff value and understand the importance of emergency management and EOC training; however, a focus on effective technology and communication tools and methods must now be a priority.*** Staff and others interviewed indicated severe constraints for a variety of reasons in obtaining and dispensing information. Due to the heavy reliance on other agencies and the ICP for information, the City's focus needs to be on mastering the ability to gather accurate data from first responders and to readily transmit this information to community members.

2. ***Training in emergency management roles and responsibilities across the City has focused on specific functional areas (e.g., shelter, public information) which may not be practical in an incident the size of the Woolsey Fire.*** Arriving at the EOC or out in the field, some staff roles and responsibilities were superseded, i.e., staff were often directed to do other things in order to manage or respond to the incident moment by moment. Senior managers and other staff may have to assume other roles for which they may be unprepared or, more importantly, not familiar. Training

and understanding of all roles and responsibilities even at a cursory level is critical.

3. ***The City Manager served as the primary liaison between the City Council and the rest of the organization and the EOC and during this event. That role was stretched thin, which was made especially acute with a citywide evacuation.*** *T*he City Manager spent considerable time with elected officials during and immediately after this event, which impacted her time and capacity for the broader response issues and organizational management.

4. ***The City Manager and Public Safety Manager voluntarily supported the Santa Rosa EOC during and following the Tubbs Fire, which provided good training on such an event.*** Immediately during and following the Tubbs Fire, the City Manager and Public Safety Manager went to Santa Rosa to supplement City staff in the Santa Rosa EOC. In addition to providing relief to their city employees, this provided an opportunity to learn first-hand from the emergency responders and city employees.

5. ***Many Malibu staff are new to the EOC and may not have understood their roles or, more critically, the obligation of City employees to check-in and/or specifically respond in an emergency.*** Recognizing that technology, communication challenges and the changing and fast-moving fire contributed to confusion and the inability to respond, employees still need to understand they have a role to play, even if it is not on site. Improving communication protocols and technology will help fill this need.

Recommendations

The following recommendations relate to EOC training and preparedness with the goal of improving the City's current practices within its own EOC.

Recommendation 7. Conduct EOC trainings quarterly that focus on exercises specifically designed to address the unique needs of the Malibu community. The training exercises need to be customized based on the City's environment where emergency first responders are under the direction of other agencies.

DRAFT

Recommendation 8. Build on any existing database of City employees to maximize limited staff resources during a disaster. Such a database should include where City employees live and what level of EOC training they have had, as well as some preferences for what they are comfortable doing.

Recommendation 9. Review and document the formal steps required in various emergency declaration policies and procedures and assign responsibility for carrying them out.

Recommendation 10. Establish a policy that formalizes EOC team member participation in the EOCs of other municipalities in times of emergency. The fact that both the City Manager and Public Safety Manager had volunteered to work in the Santa Rosa Tubbs Fire incident EOC, is noteworthy and a best practice for a community like Malibu**.** The policy should formalize the city's support for Malibu staff to work in the EOC of another city during emergency response efforts. The on-the-ground training experience gained from assisting other cities during an emergency response effort can help expose staff to unforeseen issues and prepare them for challenging conditions.

CERT and Community Involvement

The City of Malibu administers a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program through its Public Safety Manager. The CERT training provides basic training in safety and lifesaving skills to members of the Malibu community. The CERT program was originally developed in 1985 by the Los Angeles City Fire Department and is recognized nationwide as a best practice. Following a major disaster, professional first responders who provide fire and medical services may not be able to fully meet the demand for services. This section outlines how the City of Malibu utilized its CERT volunteers or community members in response to the fire.

Major Observations

1. ***Supplies stored for use by CERT volunteers and ultimate distribution to the community were consistent with what may be needed in the event of an earthquake.*** The supplies left in the CERT kits contained food that was expired and much of the supplies contained items not useful in a wildfire event, such as thermal blankets. CERT volunteer involvement was limited since

many CERT members evacuated. The remaining volunteers were able to perform 30 to 40 welfare checks, but more tools and support could have improved their effectiveness.

2. ***The City has an active CERT training program and has done several public safety town hall meetings, preparedness videos and held a safety expo for the community.*** These efforts should be built on and expanded, especially since there will likely be heightened interest by the public in participating.

3. ***Some civilian responder emergency preparedness partners, e.g., Volunteers on Patrol (VOP), businesses, CERT (some), are unclear as to how they may be most effective in such an incident or whom to contact.***

4. ***The City did not fully utilize the community's volunteers to play an active part in the evacuation and response efforts, due in part to the fact that many CERT volunteers evacuated the City.*** CERT volunteers are important partners in any emergency response and Malibu's program is robust. However, some participants believed they were not activated or coordinated to fully contribute to the response. Volunteers could provide valuable support in the areas of traffic control, door-to-door neighborhood notifications, preliminary damage assessments, and welfare checks. They can be used to complete a variety of tasks during and after the event, including providing a CERT representative at the EOC.

5. ***Obtaining input from outside the walls of City Hall may be a valuable way to help meet the needs of the community regarding disaster preparedness and the role of the City during disasters.*** To achieve this input, the City could establish some type of residents' committee to offer "on the ground" suggestions about community preparedness and the City's response to disasters.

Recommendations

The following recommendations related to CERT and community involvement include improving the role definition of CERT volunteers in the case of an emergency and using the existing resources and volunteers to improve communications with the community.

Recommendation 11. Redesign the City's CERT program to include regular inspection of the CERT medical and food supplies as well as additional training and guidance

on how to effectively provide support in the case of a natural disaster of this magnitude. CERT members should have a list of responsibilities to perform during and after a disaster, even when communication networks break down so they can continue to serve the City, absent explicit direction.

Recommendation 12. Establish a policy that formally assigns a CERT representative to the EOC.

Recommendation 13. Establish a residents' committee designed to offer practical suggestions to the City on response to the Woolsey Fire and on disaster preparedness efforts in the community.

DRAFT

Organizational Structure and EOC Operations

Malibu is unique in its EOC structure and operations due to its significant reliance on large, outside agencies for services. The City is challenged by the need to coordinate with the various agencies that have many other competing demands and contract cities. Despite these challenges, there have been significant efforts to improve the effectiveness of the EOC. As mentioned previously, the City Manager and Public Safety Manager voluntarily supported another jurisdiction during a wildfire to offer help and learn from the experience, demonstrating dedication to continual improvement.

The Woolsey Fire tested the Malibu EOC operations through an unprecedented situation requiring the City's EOC to relocate outside of the city limits. This move created challenges regarding communications and surfaced inefficiencies in EOC policies and procedures.

The following provides our major observations and recommendations in this area.

EOC and Relocation of the EOC

The City's need to relocate the EOC outside the city limits greatly impacted its ability to communicate with outside agencies and the community. City leaders could not physically access the alternative locations for the EOC to relocate due to the nature and severity of the fire, resulting in a relocation to an unplanned alternative site.

Major Observations

1. ***The City maintains an EOC that is physically separate from the LA County EOC and though both agencies provide a liaison to the other, this complicates emergency response.*** Also, Malibu can be cut off from the rest of LA County and is susceptible to emergencies that may not impact the County as a whole. Because LA County agencies are responsible for the vast majority of first responder services, the City should consider some way to co-locate with County EOC operations at a joint Malibu EOC location.

DRAFT

2. ***City emergency preparedness plans currently address a secondary EOC location in close proximity to City Hall. Having to move outside the City, as was the case with the Woolsey Fire evacuation, presented unplanned issues for staff.*** (The City Manager's professional network was critically important in finding a good alternative). While the Santa Monica EOC is a well laid out and well-equipped Emergency Operating Center, Malibu staff commented about a number of constraints because they were not familiar with the EOC and did not have the equipment and information they needed. For example, the field staff did not have the landline numbers at the EOC and since most of the mobile phone numbers were not working, access to information was severely impacted. Personal computers and satellite phones had been left in Malibu City Hall along with home contact information for City staff, which impacted communications with staff about when they were needed.

3. ***The forced relocation of the EOC (as well as the entire community) out of Malibu resulted in a critically important functional communication gap between City leaders, the community, and first responders for about 16 hours in the early stages of the incident.*** Although staff were engaged in the incident from various sectors, an EOC was not formally staffed for 16 hours between 4 pm on November 9 and 8 am on November 10. EOC sign-in sheets along with interviewee accounts demonstrated that the EOC was not functional during this time. A gap in EOC activities for that length of time during such a critical event led to the EOC having to catch up on what happened during the transition, limiting their effectiveness. In addition, the limitations on access back into the City had a hampering effect on the City's ability to be of service and respond to needs.

4. ***City staff left behind critical information and equipment when the EOC was forced to relocate.*** Equipment such as laptops, satellite phones, personal contact information, and payroll information made operations in the new location exceedingly difficult.

5. ***The Assistant City Manager effectively managed the remote EOC as the City Manager remained in Malibu during and immediately following the fire threat to manage local issues and report to the Incident Command Center.*** The City Manager remained in Malibu

on a daily basis, resolving a number of issues that arose during the event as well as orchestrating the delivery of supplies to Zuma Beach for those who did not evacuate. She also kept Council members and City staff members informed about current conditions of the City.

Recommendations

The recommendations related to the relocation of the EOC contain solutions on how to better prepare for situations like the Woolsey Fire where the EOC needed to be relocated outside City limits. By preparing for these types of situations, City staff can establish formal backup plans and redundancies to improve their ability to support response efforts and coordinate with external agencies.

Recommendation 14. Explore development of a joint EOC location in partnership with LA County EOC representatives. Given the potential for further disasters as a result of Malibu's isolated and geographically challenging location, this objective might be achieved through a mobile EOC.

Recommendation 15. Designate formal alternative sites with reliable communication systems for the EOC outside of the City limits, including consideration of a Mobile Command Center to house the EOC. Malibu should prepare for the possibility of having to move the EOC to a safer location in a future event. Potential locations should be identified and visited, addresses and phone numbers (landlines) should be gathered for each location and distributed to each EOC and field responder for their emergency response kit.

Recommendation 16. Practice EOC relocation as part of future training efforts. Relocation should include creating a list of what needs to be taken and who is responsible for making sure it arrives at the new location, including how the materials and equipment will be transported.

EOC Policies and Procedures

The existing EOC policies and procedures, while thorough, do not address the unique needs required for an event as devastating as the Woolsey Fire. The current plans do not include sufficient redundancies or back-up staffing to accommodate the challenges related to staff

accessibility, transportation limitations, or access to City resources. This section outlines our major observations related to existing EOC policies and procedures.

Major Observations

1. ***A consistent protocol is lacking on how to contact City staff in the event of an emergency to alert them of EOC schedules and the evacuation of City Hall.*** Interviewees noted that there were inconsistencies in how staff were first notified about the fire. The initial notices appear to have been sent by each department director, although not everyone received calls or texts from their director. Some employees called their director and some reported that they never received notice from the City.

   Everbridge was intended as a tool for communicating with the public but can also be used to communicate with sub-groups such as city employees if they have signed up to receive Everbridge notices. Everbridge was used to communicate to employees that City Hall would be reopened but was not part of earlier communications. Not every employee has a City cell phone and the current City policy is that employees may not receive City email on personal phones.

2. ***EOC shift scheduling does not maximize the staffs' time, creating inefficiencies.*** Staff commented that the EOC shift changes took longer than expected, requiring staff to stay longer than anticipated. The long shift changes mean that staff are at risk of burnout and adds additional stress to an already demanding situation, especially for a prolonged period. If the schedule was crafted in a way that allows for the time that it takes to change shifts, then staff would better understand the expectations of them, allowing them to more effectively plan their transportation and calendars.

3. ***Employees were required to fill positions in the EOC they were not familiar with and/or had no training.*** Many employees were unable to access the EOC, were on vacation, or could not be reached. In emergency situations, City employees may also be evacuated or affected by the disaster themselves.

4. ***Employees in the EOC were not getting equal access to up-to-date information.*** The EOC Director and Section Director briefings were held in a conference room down the hall due to the noise

level in the EOC area. Not all Section Directors relayed the information from these briefings to others working in their sections.

5. ***Mutual aid agreements for Geographic Information System (GIS) assistance are with the County, but due to the size of this incident, the County was unable to assist.*** The County was simultaneously responding to the same event, which impacted the City's access to planned support efforts.

Recommendations

The recommendations related to EOC policies and procedures include addressing opportunities to document and formalize staffing enhancements, scheduling, and communications to enhance the effectiveness of the EOC.

Recommendation 17. Develop EOC operation redundancies that allow for continuous operation of the EOC even in times of transition. Establishing various teams and redundancies in communication methods (e.g., phone, e-mail, etc.) as well as staffing will enable the EOC to remain continuously operational.

Recommendation 18. Schedule EOC shifts to allow 30 to 60 minutes of overlap between the person leaving and the person taking over.

Recommendation 19. Establish formal cross-training in EOC operations to create greater redundancies in each functional area. Since most employees do not live in the City and the areas can be difficult to access during an incident, employees may need to fill many roles in the case of an emergency.

Recommendation 20. Reevaluate the City policy limiting employee access to work emails and alerts on personal devices. Most cities allow work email to be accessed on personal devices, within a comprehensive policy and procedure regulating such use.

Recommendation 21. Educate the City Council about the roles and responsibilities of staff and Council during an emergency event.

Recommendation 22. Formalize mutually supportive relationships between the City of Malibu and

DRAFT

neighboring cities to provide aid in the event of an emergency. These are currently informal.

Recommendation 23. Establish communication protocols from Section Directors to EOC staff to ensure equal access to information for all EOC employees.

Recommendation 24. Establish a formal system for communicating with employees with built-in redundancies.

Recommendation 25. Require all staff to sign up for notifications from the City on the Everbridge alert system.

Recommendation 26. Provide City-owned phones to all employees who are responsible for assignments during an emergency in the field or at the EOC.

Recommendation 27. Adopt an administrative policy that requires staff to respond to an emergency notice within a set period (e.g., one hour) by text, email, or phone. In a city with a small staff, everyone should be made aware that they may be called in to assist in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 28. Develop back-up mutual aid agreements that ensure GIS assistance is available.

DRAFT

Information Gathering and Dissemination

Given Malibu's reliance on outside agencies, the gathering of information from the various stakeholders proved challenging during the Woolsey Fire. Although City of Malibu staff attended various multi-jurisdictional meetings to gather information, significant staff time and resources are needed to stay on top of the many updates. Strong relationships with the agency liaisons are also necessary.

A critical role of the City during an emergency such as this is the need to communicate with residents to keep them informed. The information gathering and dissemination efforts must clearly delineate the responsibilities of the City and those of the outside agencies.

Clarifying the Role of the City

City staff and the elected officials are highly visible in a situation like this, which makes it especially challenging when there is little control over the operations of the emergency responders. There are appropriately significant expectations for the City to remain up to date on response efforts and to communicate with community members to ensure that critical information is being relayed in a timely manner. This section summarizes the major observations and recommendations as they relate to the City's role in an emergency as well as the perceptions of the City's role.

Major Observations

1. ***Regardless of institutional roles and responsibilities, community members believe the City is a first responder and critically responsible for linking various outside agencies and ensuring accurate and reliable information to the extent possible.*** The environmental constraints, lack of operational cell towers and relocation of the EOC, as well as the fire, impacted City leaders' ability to meet this latter, real mission.

2. ***Community members lack understanding about the City's role in this incident (not a first responder), and about their own responsibilities and expectations should they choose to shelter in***

place instead of evacuating. Many residents practiced the "Stay and Defend" procedures versus the widely accepted "Ready-Set-Go" protocol. The City is not obligated to provide logistical support for those who defy a mandatory evacuation order, but its planning must assume that some individuals will do so.

Recommendations

The recommendations related to clarifying the role of the City include creating awareness of the City's part in emergency response and the roles of other outside agencies. By communicating the responsibilities of each agency to the community, expectations about services should improve and be more accurate. The following recommendations contain specific steps to support the initiation of a public education effort to better clarify the City's responsibilities related to emergency response.

Recommendation 29. Educate residents about their role and responsibilities during and after a disaster. The City should define residents' responsibilities, how they can be better prepared, and how their role differs from that of the City or first responders. City staff should educate the public about the expectations and preparedness of evacuation versus shelter in place.

Recommendation 30. Establish information kiosks to be placed at key locations during emergencies. Having a gathering place where residents can go to obtain information is an important part of a good communication strategy, especially when power is out, or people are stranded. It is important to assign City personnel to set-up, monitor and update the kiosks.

Gathering Information from Emergency Responders

City leaders relied on information from external agencies heavily throughout this incident due to the nature of the contractual relationships and the fact that the EOC was relocated outside city limits with very little access to those who remained in Malibu. Due to the City's inaccessibility to service providers who were executing the response plan, City leaders were constantly trying to chase down information from multiple parties. This section summarizes the major observations and recommendations related to the City's coordination and communication with agencies responsible for emergency response efforts. To some degree the issues highlighted here also support the need to develop some type of joint EOC capacity in the Malibu area.

DRAFT

Major Observations

1. ***The EOC experienced difficulties getting timely and accurate information from the Incident Command Post (ICP) and the Joint Information Center (JIC).*** Soliciting a response to questions or receiving an update about operations required multiple efforts from those in the EOC, which made it difficult to communicate consistent information to residents. The relocation of the EOC, while necessary, generated a whole array of unanticipated and unplanned communication issues.

2. ***Malibu has relied on agency relationships to get information in the past. While not unusual, such relationships can impact response capabilities if individuals have shifted or changed positions.*** During prior incidents, one of the City employees was a reserve officer with the County Sheriff and therefore had private telephone numbers to access the Sheriff's Department for information. That employee is no longer with the City and that access is lost. In the Woolsey Fire, the City Manager's connections were used to access mutual aid and provide for the backup EOC in Santa Monica.

3. ***The City of Malibu does not maintain a formally designated liaison to the LA County Fire Department due to the fact that it lies within the Fire District, rather than a city that contracts for service.*** The contractual relationship between Malibu and the LA Sheriff's Department enables negotiation about the services provided to the City. Since the City of Malibu is within the Fire District, the City does not have the same relationship or influence that might otherwise be possible.

4. ***The City of Malibu's relationship with CalFire is through LA Fire, limiting the City's ability to involve them in any training or drills***. CalFire contracts with LA Fire to protect the State Responsibility Area (SRA) for initial attack only. Once the attack grows beyond that, CalFire retains statutory authority over the wildland, while LA Fire retains authority over structures and improvements.

Recommendations

The recommendations related to gathering information from emergency responders include solutions for improving the ability of the City to gather timely and accurate information from external partner agencies.

DRAFT

Relying on relationships based on specific employees is too tenuous. If an employee is not available, neither are those relationships.

Recommendation 31. Request the Los Angeles County Fire Department to assign a liaison to the City of Malibu to attend safety trainings, drills, and public education efforts.

Recommendation 32. Establish an ongoing relationship with CalFire with the goal of ensuring their participation in training exercises, public education, and prevention efforts.

Recommendation 33. Create redundancy in critical messaging and communications with all appropriate outside agencies, including state and federal agencies.

Community Communications

Due to the City's limitations in emergency response, its most critical role is relaying information to the public. City leaders were dealing with unforeseen challenges, including the relocation of the EOC and lack of cell coverage, that hindered the ability to execute planned communications. This section summarizes major observations and recommendations related to the City's communications with the community.

Major Observations

Cell coverage in and around Malibu is not good generally and the impact of this event reinforced the need for redundancies and protocols for alternatives when Wi-Fi and cell coverage are gone. All affected by an event of this type should be allowed to access the emergency alert system through a cellular network.

1. ***There was no central geographic or digital location for residents to reference to obtain regular updates.*** The City relied heavily on Everbridge and Nixle notifications, which require users to opt in. The City posted regularly on its social media, but the City did not post regular updates to its website.

2. ***The City has two community information systems (Everbridge for emergencies and Nixle for day-to-day communications) that may be confusing to the public who could be looking to Nixle for communications during emergencies.***

DRAFT

3. ***Media calls consumed the Media Information Officer's (MIO) time.*** While other staff were assigned to assist the MIO, the impact of the influx of media calls limited the ability to communicate with the public.

4. ***The loss of power and some cellular coverage made it difficult to reach all populations within the City and greater Malibu (zip code 90256).*** City staff should investigate what the cost and viability of other forms of communication might be and should consider investing in those technologies.

5. ***The City does not have a formal public education program on wildfire prevention to help the community better understand ways to limit the risk of major damage and recognize the conditions that increase susceptibility to fire.*** City staff should explore the feasibility of expanding their public education program and bolster the resources available on the website to educate residents, visitors, and businesses about how to reduce the risk of fire.

6. ***Emergency alerts sent to the community had a citywide focus, not specific to the unique neighborhoods in Malibu.*** While the current alert system does have the ability to send specific alerts to certain neighborhoods, that functionality was not utilized until after the evacuation orders had been made. Malibu has a distinct and unique terrain, limiting accessibility in some neighborhoods. The City should devote time and resources to understand neighborhood-by-neighborhood preparedness efforts and tailor the prevention efforts based on the topography. There is already a fairly detailed inventory of information that can be used for this purpose. City staff should utilize mapping resources to identify specific measures that should be taken in each neighborhood, including evacuation options by neighborhood.

7. ***Information dissemination during and following the fire was constrained by several factors, including difficulty validating information, the lean staffing levels dedicated to public outreach, and the multi-agency response effort of this incident.*** City staff utilized numerous tools to communicate with the public. In addition to Everbridge mass notifications and the use of Nixle, the City relied on information sharing via Twitter, Facebook, Nextdoor, and Instagram multiple times a day. Text and email messages were also shared with those individuals who had

DRAFT

previously registered to receive such emergency messages (over 4,500 subscribers).

Recommendations

The recommendations related to community communications entail solutions for how to better relay information to the public during an emergency. As mentioned previously, a key role of the City of Malibu in emergency response is its duty to disseminate information to the community including updates on the status of a fire (or other type of emergency), the activities of emergency responders, and action required by community members.

Recommendation 34. Train more staff members and volunteers to assist the City's Media Information Officer in the dissemination and distribution of public information before, during and immediately after a disaster. There are likely many individuals with some background in media relations and communications in the community who would be willing to be part of a volunteer communications corps.

Recommendation 35. Implement state guidelines for issuance of emergency alerts and advisories with the FEMA Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system as a supplement to the other messaging channels used by the City.

Recommendation 36. Investigate the cost and feasibility of additional mobile cell stations on wheels (COWs), radio broadcast capabilities, and/or some type of siren warning system. Determine the feasibility of addressing radio communication "dead spots" through utilization of a broadcast system or enhancements to their repeater and radio capabilities.

Recommendation 37. Undertake a program to work with service providers to fire-harden cell phone tower sites around the Malibu area.

Recommendation 38. Conduct a campaign to encourage residents and businesses to sign up for Everbridge notifications. The campaign should include those who identify with Malibu but may not live within City boundaries.

DRAFT

Recommendation 39. Create a redundant and robust notification warning system. In a crisis, communication with the community is important to engage them in the City's response activities so they can have confidence in the City's response and are prepared to help.

Recommendation 40. Conduct a survey of residents and businesses in Malibu to determine the best means of communicating information to them using social media outlets and communication technology.

Recommendation 41. Create disaster preparedness information to be distributed to all City residents and visitors through all media outlets, explaining specific actions to be followed if evacuations are directed by public safety officials.

Recommendation 42. Design, develop, and implement a Firewise public education system, and include materials to be provided to residents and visitors. A program like Firewise USA from the National Fire Protection Association could help community members understand the actions needed to prepare and protect their homes against wildfire threats.

Recommendation 43. Conduct a self-evaluation, facilitate workshops, and initiate steps to have the entire City become a registered operational Firewise-wildfire recognized site. Since Firewise sites are limited to a maximum of 2,500 dwelling units, work with Homeowners Associations (HOA's) and/or community groups to develop discrete Firewise sites based on geography and neighborhood or HOA boundaries.

Recommendation 44. Communicate any changes to emergency preparedness procedures to the public in a timely manner. Given Malibu's geographic location and the increase in California wildfires, City staff should increase their communication about emergency response planning with residents and businesses as soon as possible.

Recommendation 45. Collect information on the individual geographical challenges to the various areas within Malibu. City staff should utilize this information to develop an internal database to collect information on the

DRAFT

various neighborhoods within Malibu including an assessment of fire risk, topographical challenges, existing resources, unique needs and challenges, and ingress/egress limitations.

Recommendation 46. Acquire an adequate number of hand-held radios to supplement the existing radio count in providing emergency communications devices to mutual aid responding agencies, City leaders, CERT personnel, and volunteers.

DRAFT

Evacuation and Repopulation

The evacuation process during the Woolsey Fire received significant community and media attention due to high traffic and long wait times for residents leaving via Pacific Highway. In hindsight it could have been handled better, especially in terms of turning northbound lanes southbound sooner. The City of Malibu has its own evacuation plan; however, the City is not responsible for determining if and when mandatory evacuation is necessary or how it is executed. However, the City can help inform these plans by participating in shaping more robust evacuation planning and providing more Malibu-specific information.

Like the evacuation, the repopulation efforts yielded similar challenges with respect to the lack of input collected by the City about the creation of the plan and the highly fragmented approach from the various agencies involved. There was something of an ad-hoc quality around repopulation, and this is probably one of the greatest areas where more training and practice can yield dividends. One of the important lessons learned from both the evacuation and repopulation efforts is the need for multi-agency planning and practice for these efforts.

Implementation of the Mandatory Evacuation

The Woolsey Fire required a mandatory evacuation of the City. The accelerated pace of the fire and traffic delays impacted the ability for many to follow the evacuation order. While the City of Malibu did not determine the necessity of the mandatory evacuation, the City played a large role in ensuring that community members knew about and were able to evacuate, in coordination with other agencies. This section summarizes the major observations and recommendations related to the implementation of the mandatory evacuation order.

Major Observations

1. ***Law enforcement and fire agencies are technically responsible for organizing and implementing evacuations during an emergency which, in great measure, compromised the City's ability to influence the decision making in this incident.*** Typically, LAFD determines where and when an evacuation should occur and

LASD implements the evacuation plan. The plan was developed at the ICP level and implemented by LA Fire and executed by the LASD. However, City staff have the greatest understanding and appreciation of terrain challenges, density issues, traffic and circulation patterns, vulnerable populations, etc. and should be intimately involved in evacuation planning with public safety and emergency response agencies.

2. ***While understandably urgent, there is a perception that the mandatory evacuation order was used as a blunt instrument, rather than a tool to control the safe exit of community members.*** Although the evacuation order is not under the control of the City of Malibu and evacuations are led by public safety agencies, the evacuation was treated more as a toggle switch (on or off), rather than a dimmer switch (phasing the movement of people).

3. ***Based on interviews (not a survey), many residents appeared to have defied the mandatory evacuation order due to traffic and wanting to stay and fight the fire, but as important is the fact that some did not know how to evacuate or what to do.*** The mandatory evacuation order led to significant traffic delays and many residents directly defied the order. Traffic began to back up on Pacific Coast Highway (PCH) during the early afternoon on Friday, November 9. Westbound PCH was closed to traffic and northbound canyon routes being closed directly exacerbated the traffic.

4. ***The mandatory evacuation order did not clearly state who was able to leave and reenter the City.*** Interviewees reported that anyone with a press pass could come and go freely. But we heard numerous reports of legitimate individuals (e.g., Council members, CERT members, City staff and healthcare workers) trying to reenter unsuccessfully or with great difficulty. Other city staff tried to access the EOC by passing through the City but were unable to do so.

5. ***Residents who chose or were forced to stay behind refused to leave the area to obtain supplies or services because they were not allowed to reenter.*** This created a situation where basic supplies were denied to neighborhoods that were otherwise out of harm's way but were caught in a situation where they couldn't leave without significant consequences.

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Recommendations

The recommendations related to the implementation of the mandatory evacuation are intended to support improvements to the evacuation process through planning and coordination to avoid the challenges experienced in the Woolsey Fire such as traffic jams and confusion around when and how to evacuate. Though the City does not determine when or if a mandatory evacuation is required, improved coordination with outside agencies is important, as is providing input critical to execution.

Recommendation 47. Establish a tiered evacuation plan for Malibu working with public safety agencies (LA Sheriff's Department, CHP, LA Fire, Caltrans), with emphasis on certain steps to follow when calling for an evacuation.

Recommendation 48. Working with first responders, Caltrans, and traffic engineers, develop contingent evacuation approaches by overlaying fire progression models on traffic simulation programs and optimizing evacuation flow for different fire conditions. Once models are developed, train implementation of evacuation procedures with all first responders.

Recommendation 49. Develop a set of safe refuge areas with open space, parking and fire hardened structures based on the results of evacuation modeling. Some possibilities include or example Pepperdine University, Zuma Beach and Malibu High School. Consider installing signage, mapping, shelter-in-place supplies and community education and training opportunities so temporary refuge areas are well known.

Recommendation 50. Administer official passes that clearly designate who is allowed to enter/exit the city during a mandatory evacuation order. During an emergency, when partial or full evacuations are in place, there will be times that city officials will need to pass the blockades. City staff should work with the County Sheriff to establish a universal method for essential personnel (e.g., elected officials, City personnel, CERT members, and other critical service providers) to travel past blockades.

Recommendation 51. Conduct public education about evacuation orders, including when to evacuate, how

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notification will occur, and what to do if evacuation is not possible. Part of this effort needs to focus on the fact that the City is not legally obligated to support residents who defy a mandatory evacuation order.

Repopulation Efforts

Similar to the evacuation order, the City of Malibu did not make the determination about when or how repopulation should occur. The coordination among many different agencies ultimately led to the final decision on when and how people should return to the City. Malibu staff contributed to these conversations and led the communication effort to inform community members. This section summarizes the major observations related to the City's role in the repopulation efforts.

Major Observations

1. ***Repopulation plans required input from various agencies for each iteration and this was consistent during the incident.*** LASD and other public safety agencies developed repopulation plans that relied on information from many stakeholder agencies including various departments from the City of Malibu, Southern California Edison, and Caltrans.

   The complexity of developing plans that satisfy all requirements from each stakeholder agency demonstrates the multifaceted response required at each stage of response. City staff should take the lead in examining with other public safety agencies the opportunity to establish repopulation criteria on a neighborhood by neighborhood basis.

Recommendations

The recommendations related to repopulation are intended to help eliminate the challenges experienced during the community's return to the City. Similar to the evacuation, the City lacks the control of determining when the repopulation occurs but has critical information that can assist the outside agencies such as Malibu-specific knowledge.

Recommendation 52. Establish protocols with first responder agencies to ensure City staff members participate in repopulation planning efforts from the beginning to ensure the plans adequately address the unique needs and conditions of the City of Malibu.

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Recommendation 53. Develop a process for organized reentry to allow for the safe and timely return of community members to their homes.

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Conclusion

As we continue our discussions with stakeholders and complete our analysis, there may be other observations or recommendations to share. City leaders have already acknowledged the need to learn and take action relative to the challenges that occurred during the response to the fire and recovery efforts. It is already doing so. For example, a test of the Everbridge emergency notification system occurred on June 26 to determine the quality of the list of cell phone numbers provided for use on the mobile app.

To gain the trust of the community, it will be important that the changes implemented are strategically developed, thoroughly vetted, and communicated to the public. A critical component in implementing these changes is continued understanding of the trauma and devastation that this disaster caused in the community. As with any disaster of this magnitude there is hurt and anger that must be processed, but this should not impede efforts to learn and improve performance.

By acknowledging the identified areas of improvement and communicating the investment that has been made in continuous improvement in its emergency operations, City leaders are demonstrating a commitment to the safety of the Malibu community. This process will ultimately allow them to improve responses to emergency situations in the future and provide an opportunity to educate the community about emergency response, inherent limitations, and the need for preparedness. Given Malibu's location and vulnerability, a priority focus on this need should always be one of the primary functions within the City organization and larger community.

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Attachment A. List of Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Form an emergency Malibu Disaster Council (multi-agency committee) that includes all relevant stakeholders susceptible to wildfire events and other major disasters.

Recommendation 2. Conduct training exercises quarterly with partner agencies that would provide service to the City of Malibu in the case of an emergency.

Recommendation 3. Conduct one or more EOC drills with partner public safety and transportation agencies that involve an evacuation of residents.

Recommendation 4. Work with other municipalities and public safety personnel through regional, large-scale, public events to expose and train staff on emergency response mobilization and enhance the experience levels of EOC staff.

Recommendation 5. Work with the LA Fire Department to formally assign a staff member to work with the City moving forward on training exercises.

Recommendation 6. Train several City staff members about City Council liaison responsibilities so the City Manager is not the sole person tasked with this responsibility.

Recommendation 7. Conduct EOC trainings quarterly that focus on exercises specifically designed to address the unique needs of the Malibu community.

Recommendation 8. Build on any existing database of City employees to maximize limited staff resources during a disaster.

Recommendation 9. Review and document the formal steps required in various emergency declaration policies and procedures and assign responsibility for carrying them out.

Recommendation 10. Establish a policy that formalizes EOC team member participation in the EOCs of other municipalities in times of emergency.

Recommendation 11. Redesign the City's CERT program to include regular inspection of the CERT medical and food supplies as well as additional training and guidance on how to effectively provide support in the case of a natural disaster of this magnitude.

Recommendation 12. Establish a policy that formally assigns a CERT representative to the EOC.

Recommendation 13. Establish a residents' committee designed to offer practical suggestions to the City on response to the Woolsey Fire and on disaster preparedness efforts in the community.

Recommendation 14. Explore development of a joint EOC location in partnership with LA County EOC representatives.

Recommendation 15. Designate formal alternative sites with reliable communication systems for the EOC outside of the City limits, including consideration of a Mobile Command Center to house the EOC.

Recommendation 16. Practice EOC relocation as part of future training efforts.

DRAFT

Recommendation 17. Develop EOC operation redundancies that allow for continuous operation of the EOC even in times of transition.

Recommendation 18. Schedule EOC shifts to allow 30 to 60 minutes of overlap between the person leaving and the person taking over.

Recommendation 19. Establish formal cross-training in EOC operations to create greater redundancies in each functional area.

Recommendation 20. Reevaluate the City policy limiting employee access to work emails and alerts on personal devices.

Recommendation 21. Educate the City Council about the roles and responsibilities of staff and Council during an emergency event.

Recommendation 22. Formalize mutually supportive relationships between the City of Malibu and neighboring cities to provide aid in the event of an emergency.

Recommendation 23. Establish communication protocols from Section Directors to EOC staff to ensure equal access to information for all EOC employees.

Recommendation 24. Establish a formal system for communicating with employees with built-in redundancies.

Recommendation 25. Require all staff to sign up for notifications from the City on the Everbridge alert system.

Recommendation 26. Provide City-owned phones to all employees who are responsible for assignments during an emergency in the field or at the EOC.

Recommendation 27. Adopt an administrative policy that requires staff to respond to an emergency notice within a set period (e.g., one hour) by text, email, or phone.

Recommendation 28. Develop back-up mutual aid agreements that ensure GIS assistance is available.

Recommendation 29. Educate residents about their role and responsibilities during and after a disaster.

Recommendation 30. Establish information kiosks to be placed at key locations during emergencies.

Recommendation 31. Request the Los Angeles County Fire Department to assign a liaison to the City of Malibu to attend safety trainings, drills, and public education efforts.

Recommendation 32. Establish an ongoing relationship with CalFire with the goal of ensuring their participation in training exercises, public education, and prevention efforts.

Recommendation 33. Create redundancy in critical messaging and communications with all appropriate outside agencies, including state and federal agencies.

Recommendation 34. Train more staff members and volunteers to assist the City's Media Information Officer in the dissemination and distribution of public information before, during and immediately after a disaster.

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Recommendation 35. Implement state guidelines for issuance of emergency alerts and advisories with the FEMA Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system as a supplement to the other messaging channels used by the City.

Recommendation 36. Investigate the cost and feasibility of additional mobile cell stations on wheels (COWs), radio broadcast capabilities, and/or some type of siren warning system.

Recommendation 37. Undertake a program to work with service providers to fire-harden cell phone tower sites around the Malibu area.

Recommendation 38. Conduct a campaign to encourage residents and businesses to sign up for Everbridge notifications.

Recommendation 39. Create a redundant and robust notification warning system.

Recommendation 40. Conduct a survey of residents and businesses in Malibu to determine the best means of communicating information to them using social media outlets and communication technology.

Recommendation 41. Create disaster preparedness information to be distributed to all City residents and visitors through all media outlets, explaining specific actions to be followed if evacuations are directed by public safety officials.

Recommendation 42. Design, develop, and implement a Firewise public education system, and include materials to be provided to residents and visitors.

Recommendation 43. Conduct a self-evaluation, facilitate workshops, and initiate steps to have the entire City become a registered operational Firewise-wildfire recognized site.

Recommendation 44. Communicate any changes to emergency preparedness procedures to the public in a timely manner.

Recommendation 45. Collect information on the individual geographical challenges to the various areas within Malibu.

Recommendation 46. Acquire an adequate number of hand-held radios to supplement the existing radio count in providing emergency communications devices to mutual aid responding agencies, City leaders, CERT personnel, and volunteers.

Recommendation 47. Establish a tiered evacuation plan for Malibu working with public safety agencies (LA Sheriff's Department, CHP, LA Fire, Caltrans), with emphasis on certain steps to follow when calling for an evacuation.

Recommendation 48. Working with first responders, Caltrans, and traffic engineers, develop contingent evacuation approaches by overlaying fire progression models on traffic simulation programs and optimizing evacuation flow for different fire conditions.

Recommendation 49. Develop a set of safe refuge areas with open space, parking and fire hardened structures based on the results of evacuation modeling.

Recommendation 50. Administer official passes that clearly designate who is allowed to enter/exit the city during a mandatory evacuation order.

Recommendation 51. Conduct public education about evacuation orders, including when to evacuate, how notification will occur, and what to do if evacuation is not possible.

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Recommendation 52. Establish protocols with first responder agencies to ensure City staff members participate in repopulation planning efforts from the beginning to ensure the plans adequately address the unique needs and conditions of the City of Malibu.

Recommendation 53. Develop a process for organized reentry to allow for the safe and timely return of community members to their homes.

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Attachment B. List of Interviews Conducted

Table 2. List of Interviewees

Elected Officials	City Staff	Public Safety Agency Staff	Community Members	Others
• Karen Ferrer, Mayor Pro Tem • Mikke Pierson, Councilmember • Skylar Peak, Councilmember • Jefferson Wagner, Mayor • Rick Mullen, Councilmember • Lou La Monte, Councilmember 2010-18 • Laura Rosenthal, Councilmember 2010-18	• Christi Hogin, Counsel • Reva Feldman, City Manager • Lisa Soghor, Assistant City Manager • Bonnie Blue, Planning Director • Craig George, Environmental Sustainability Director • Jesse Bobbett, Community Services Director • Rob DuBoux, Public Works Director • Susan Dueñas, Public Safety Manager • Andria Fernandez, Senior Planner • Richard Mollica, Senior Planner • Matt Myerhoff, Media Information Officer • Elizabeth Shavelson, Assistant to the City Manager • Kate Gallo, Community Services Recreation Supervisor • Mary Linden, Executive Assistant to the City Manager • Brandie Ayala, Senior Administrative Assistant – Public Works	• Anthony Williams, Assistant Chief, Los Angeles County Fire Department • Sal "Chuck" Bacerra, Lieutenant, Los Angeles County Sheriff • Jennifer Seetoo, Lieutenant, Los Angeles County Sheriff • Kevin Kurker, Lieutenant, California Highway Patrol • Danielle Zapata, Emergency Response; Nicole Englund, County EOS (Planning and Transportation); Maria Chong-Castillo, Public Works, Fire Issues, Los Angeles County	• CeCe Woods, Community Member • Sam Hall Kaplan, Community Member • Paul Taublieb, Community Member • Richard Garvey, Lead CERT Volunteer • Barbara Bruderlin, Chamber of Commerce CEO	• Mark Russo, Riviera 2 Easement Manager, VOP • Terri Pond, President, IT Crisis Services, Inc. • Brent Woodworth, Chairman/CEO, Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Foundation • Kristin Cook, Public Safety Director, West Hollywood • Abdi Saghafi, Eric Menjivar, Mort Frankahrth, Deborah Wong, Caltrans

Management Partners made attempts to contact the following people but was unable to obtain a response or an interview:

- *Scott Brown, Southern California Edison, Fire Management Officer*
- *Representative from Los Angeles County Public Works, Waterworks Division*

Attachment C. List of Documents Reviewed

Ordinances and Regulations

- Emergency Services Organization (Title 2, Chapter 2.52 of the Municipal Code)
- Annexation to Consolidated Fire Protection District; Withdrawal from Road District No. 3, February 21, 1991
- Memorandum of Understanding between the City of Malibu and the Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County, February 1, 2011

Policies and Documentation

- An Official's Guide to Emergency Management, City of Malibu
- SEMS/NIMS Emergency Operations Plan, City of Malibu, Updated 2012
- City of Malibu Emergency Operations Plan, Updated 2018
- EOC Check-In List, November 9, 2018, 2:30am – November 26, 2018, 4:20pm
- Nixle Alerts Sent, November 9, 2018, 1:33am – November 21, 2018, 12:43pm (Attachment D)
- Everbridge Notifications, November 9, 2018

Reports by City Staff or Other Agencies

- Reports to Public Safety Commission regarding Woolsey Fire Management, City of Malibu, January 9, 2019
- Woolsey Fire Response Presentation, Emergency Operations Bureau, Los Angeles Sheriff, Sergeant Robbie Royster

News Articles

- "City of Malibu – Malibu Rebuilds," The Malibu Times, March 7, 2019
- "As wildfire season approaches, microgrids could be a solution," Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2019
- "Disaster Response and Recovery Ad Hoc Committee to meet Sunday," Malibu Surfside News, March 14, 2019
- "Rules officially relaxed for water flow in Malibu," The Malibu Times, March 28, 2019
- "Firefighters' fateful choices: How the Woolsey Fire became an unstoppable monster," The Los Angeles Times, January 6, 2019
- "More Malibu Residents Allowed to Return Today – Update," Deadline, November 15, 2018
- "In the Age of Fast-Moving Fires, What's the Best Way to Get People Out?" KQED, June 3, 2019.

Other Reports/Presentations

- City Manager Presentations
  - February 25, 2019 (Woolsey Fire)
  - March 25, 2019 (City Accomplishments)
- EOC Woolsey Fire Action Plan, November 10, 2018

Attachment D. List of Nixle Alerts Sent by City of Malibu

Date	Message
11/9/2018 1:33	Mandatory evacuations: S of 101 Fwy, Las Virgenes to Westlake to Mulholland. N of 101 Fwy, Valley Vista to Reyes Adobe
11/9/2018 5:41	UPDATE - The City continues to monitor Woolsey Fire conditions. SMMUSD closed Malibu schools Fri, Nov 9. Parents were notified. Pepperdine
11/9/2018 7:02	MANDATORY evacuation in effect for all of City of Malibu, all areas south of 101 Fwy, from Ventura County line to Las Virgenes
11/9/2018 7:25	Traffic signals out at PCH and Coastline - expect delays.
11/9/2018 7:58	MANDATORY evacuation in effect for all areas south of 101 Fwy, from Ventura County line to Las Virgenes, NOT entire Malibu
11/9/2018 10:10	MANDATORY evacuation in effect now for all of City of Malibu + areas south of 101 Fwy, from Ventura County line to Las Virgenes/Malibu Cyn
11/9/2018 12:10	Pacific Coast Hwy. closed west/north bound from Webb Way to the Malibu city limits.
11/9/2018 12:29	Fire is now burning out of control and heading into populated areas of Malibu. All residents must evacuate immediately.
11/9/2018 12:41	New Alert Law enforcement is opening all four lanes of PCH south (east). PCH north (west) is completely closed. www.malibucity.org/alerts
11/9/2018 13:54	Evacuations in effect in Topanga Canyon areas, Monte Nido and Topanga community.
11/9/2018 21:50	UPDATE: Woolsey Fire still burning in Malibu & 0% contained; Mandatory evacuations still in effect for all of Malibu
11/10/2018 9:40	PCH remains closed LA/Ventura County Line to Sunset
11/10/2018 15:04	Woolsey Fire Update - Saturday, November 10, 2:30 PM
11/12/2018 9:43	Latest information on the Woolsey Fire in #Malibu as of Monday, November 12, at 9:30 AM.
11/12/2018 17:47	LA County Fire Dept + City of Malibu hold meeting to update Malibu evacuees of Woolsey Fire. Tues, Nov 13, 7PM at Santa Monica High
11/13/2018 10:44	Mandatory evacuation still in place for all of City of #Malibu for the #WoolseyFire. Fire is still burning actively in populated areas.
11/13/2018 13:28	UPDATE - Woolsey Fire in #Malibu, Tues, Nov 13, 1PM. All of Malibu still under mandatory evacuation. PCH closed. 101 FWY open
11/13/2018 16:24	Mandatory Evacuation lifted for portions of Eastern Malibu
11/14/2018 14:19	Mandatory Evacuation area lifted for Residents from eastern city limit to Webb Way
11/15/2018 13:18	Mandatory evacuation area lifted for #Malibu residents from eastern city limit west to Corral Canyon, with proper ID only.
11/16/2018 21:49	Woolsey Fire - new information update for Friday, November 16
11/17/2018 13:03	SCE Power Outage in Malibu Mon 11/19 8 AM- 8 PM
11/17/2018 19:13	Mandatory Evacuation Lifted for Areas of #Malibu Puerco Canyon Rd to Paradise Cove Rd for Residents
11/17/2018 21:48	Sheriff anticipates opening areas of Malibu west to Guernsey Ave, including Malibu Colony Cove, at 2PM Sunday, Nov 18
11/18/2018 11:10	Sheriff anticipates opening areas of Malibu westbound to County line, including Broad Beach, Mon, 11/19, 2PM
11/18/2018 15:40	Canyon road availability in Malibu
11/19/2018 9:33	Broad Beach area repopulation begins today at 9AM - checkpoint for residents only at PCH & Guernsey
11/19/2018 15:13	Rain expected Wed, Nov. 21 with potential mudslides & rockslides in Woolsey Fire areas
11/20/2018 13:06	Mandatory evacuation lifted for Corral Canyon area of Malibu. Update on Current Road Closures and Openings in Malibu (Tues, Nov. 20)
11/21/2018 8:16	Road access in Malibu as of Wed, Nov 21, 8AM
11/21/2018 12:18	Kanan Dume Rd opened from PCH to 101 Freeway
11/21/2018 12:43	Lower Encinal Cyn neighborhood repopulated